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NOTES AND COMMENTS
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE v.
DOHERTY: THE POLITICS OF EXTRADITION, DEPORTATION,
AND ASYLUM
I. INTRODUCTION
Joseph Patrick Thomas Doherty, an escapee from prison in North-
ern Ireland, was held without bail in the Metropolitan Correctional
Center in Manhattan for eight years without ever having been charged
with an offense in the United States.' Rather, Doherty was held await-
ing deportation to the United Kingdom' to serve a life sentence for the
murder of a British army captain in 1980.1 The Supreme Court re-
moved all obstacles to Doherty's deportation on January 15, 1992.' Fi-
nally, at 3:30 in the morning on February 19, 1992, Doherty was taken
from his cell in the federal prison in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, and put
on a plane for a sixteen-hour trip to Belfast. Doherty is now in Crumlin
Road Prison, the institution from which he escaped eleven years ago.5
Doherty's case compels a re-examination of time-honored precepts
of international law, particularly the political offense exception to ex-
1. Paul Moses, Reconsider Ruling On IRA Prisoner, Justice Dept. Asks, NEWS-
DAY, Jul. 22, 1990, at 30.
2. Doherty was held pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(1) & (a)(2)(A), authoriz-
ing the arrest and detainment of aliens awaiting deportation proceedings. A nine-year
detainment is unusual but not unheard of; the average length of internment for aliens
awaiting asylum or deportation proceedings is two years. Laurie Goodstein, First Stop
in America For Asylum Seekers: Jail, WASH. POST, Sep. 15, 1991, at A3. Doherty
twice sought and was denied habeas corpus relief, Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d
204 (2d Cir. 1991); Doherty v. Meese, 808 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1986), and requested and
was denied bail numerous times. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d at 206, 208.
3. Doherty v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, INS, 908 F.2d 1108, 1110-11 (2d Cir. 1990).
4. INS v. Doherty, 60 U.S.L.W. 4085 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1992).
5. Dennis Duggan, Mixed Feelings at Doherty Reunion, NEWSDAY, Feb. 21,
1992, at 8. In 1991 Doherty had requested a transfer from the Manhattan Correctional
Center to the federal prison in Lewisburg where he could "enjoy getting out of doors to
the little extent he may be able to." T. J. Collins, IRA Prisoner Moved, NEWSDAY,
Aug. 17, 1991, at 14.
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tradition6 and the humanitarian purposes of international refugee law.
7
By characterizing Doherty's crime as a political offense, American
judges refused to certify Doherty as extraditable, 8 thereby prohibiting
the surrender of a member of a terrorist organization to an allied dem-
ocratic government. 9 This failure to extradite Doherty pitted three at-
torneys general of the United States10 against United States judges and
magistrates in a protracted nine-year battle with implications for
United States foreign policy, immigration policies, and the United
States' commitment to international human rights conventions.
This note will examine the situation of political offenders against
the backdrop of Doherty's case. After discussing the factual and proce-
dural history of INS v. Doherty, this note will examine the origins and
applications of the political offense exception to extradition in United
States law. Secondly, this note will discuss how deportation and asylum
decisions regarding political offenders are made and whether such de-
terminations are appropriately made in light of the United States' mul-
tilateral treaty obligations. Finally, this note will explore the tension
between the United States' foreign policy objectives and its obligations
under international law to segregate asylum decisions from political
concerns. This note will conclude that the Supreme Court wrongly de-
cided Doherty, and that the Court's interpretation fails to conform with
either existing statutory law or the United States' obligations under in-
ternational agreements regarding refugees.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In Britain, the internecine warfare between Protestants and
6. See generally Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A
Knotty Problem of Extradition Law. 48 VA. L. REV. 1226 (1962) [hereinafter Garcia-
Mora].
7. 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,
1951, art. l(A)(2), 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Convention], reprinted in Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, Nov. 1, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 268
[hereinafter Protocol].
8. Matter of Doherty by Gov't of United Kingdom, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
9. Reginald Dale, Blocking the Terrorist Loophole, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec.
19, 1985, at 4; see also McMullen v. INS, 788 F.2d 591, 597 (9th Cir. 1986).
10. Despite the Court's ruling that there was no procedural bar to Doherty's de-
portation, Doherty remained in the United States until February 19, 1992. During that
time, John Cardinal O'Connor of New York and others asked Attorney General Barr
to give Doherty a hearing despite the Court's ruling. Barr refused. See Cal McCrystal,
Notebook: A Tug-of-War for America's Irish Soul, THE INDEPENDENT, Feb. 2, 1992,
at 23 [hereinafter McCrystal].
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Catholics is called "the troubles."" A complete history of the sectarian
violence in Northern Ireland is beyond the scope of this note;12 however
some understanding of the environment in which Joseph Doherty grew
up is helpful in understanding the complex issues of his case. Briefly,
after the Anglo-Irish War of 1919-1921, the Irish government agreed
to a partition of Ireland, under which the six northern counties, known
as Ulster, would remain under British rule as Northern Ireland while
the rest of the Irish Republic would be independent. 3 Because the
Catholic minority in Ulster was denied the same benefits of citizenship
as the Protestant majority, the Catholics launched a civil rights move-
ment in the 1960s. Catholic bitterness and Protestant hostility to the
Catholics' demands soon destroyed the civil rights movement's strategy
of nonviolence and set the stage for the terrorist activities of both sides
that continues to this day. 4
As a young man in Belfast, Joseph Doherty claimed he saw nonvi-
olent civil disobedience in the tradition of Martin Luther King, Jr., as
the route to end British occupation of Northern Ireland.1 5 Eventually,
however, he abandoned nonviolence and joined the Irish Republican
Army (IRA)."8 Some time before 1980, Doherty became affiliated with
the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) or "Provos," a "radical
offshoot" of the IRA. 7 On May 2, 1980, acting under orders of the
IRA, Doherty and three other Provos captured a home in Belfast, hold-
ing the family hostage as they awaited the passing of a British con-
voy.1 8 Eventually a British Army vehicle stopped outside the house, and
five members of the Army's Special Air Services (SAS) emerged, bear-
ing machine guns.19 In the ensuing gun -battle, SAS Captain Herbert
11. See, e.g., Leonard Doyle, Irish Republican Family Given Political Asylum by
U.S. Judge, THE INDEPENDENT, Jan. 10, 1992, at 3.
12. For a more comprehensive discussion of the troubles and the history of the
Irish Republican Army (IRA), see JOHN M. POLAND, UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM:
GROUPS, STRATEGIES, AND RESPONSES 109-18 (1988).
13. LEONARD B. WEINBERG & PAUL B. DAVIS, INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL
TERRORISM 32 (1989) [hereinafter WEINBERG & DAVIS].
14. Id. at 52. Twenty-seven people died as a result of terrorist attacks in Northern
Ireland in the first thirty-eight days of 1992. Craig R. Whitney, Fear, Anger and Fu-
nerals: Belfast's Troubles Mount, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1992, at 2.
15. Andrew Blake, 2 IRA Members Detained in Legal Limbo by US-British
Politics, BOSTON GLOBE, June 17, 1989, at 1 [hereinafter Legal Limbo].
16. Id.
17. Matter of Doherty by Gov't of United Kingdom, 599 F. Supp 270, 276
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
18. Id. at 272.
19. Id.
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Richard Westmacott was shot and killed.2" Doherty was arrested and
charged with murder. 1 On June 10, 1981, after the trial was com-
pleted but before the court announced a decision, Doherty and seven
others escaped from H.M. Prison, Crumlin Road, in Belfast.22 Two
days later Doherty was convicted in absentia of murder, attempted
murder, illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, and of belong-
ing to a proscribed organization.2" The court sentenced Doherty to life
imprisonment. 4 At the direction and with the assistance of the
PIRA,25 using a false passport, Doherty escaped to the United States.26
A. Doherty's Extradition Proceeding
On June 18, 1983, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
agents in New York City arrested Doherty in an Upper East Side
Manhattan bar where he worked as a bartender.2" On June 27, 1983,
Judge Constance Baker Motley issued a provisional warrant of arrest
pursuant to Article VIII of the extradition treaty between the United
States and the United Kingdom.28 The United States, on behalf of the
United Kingdom, filed a formal request for extradition in accordance
with Article VII of the Treaty in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York on August 16, 1983.9 District
Judge John E. Sprizzo heard the case as an "extradition magistrate"
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3184.30 At roughly the same time the United
20. Id. The M-60 machine gun used to kill Captain Westmacott had been stolen
from the National Guard Armory in Danvers, Massachusetts. Andrew Blake, U.S.
Judge Bars Use of Extradition Pact on Ex-IRA Member, BOSTON GLOBE, July 24,
1991, at 9.
21. Matter of Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 272.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Doherty v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, INS, 908 F.2d 1108, 1111 (2d Cir. 1990).
25. Matter of Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 276.
26. Legal Limbo, supra note 15, at 1.
27. Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d at 1111.
28. Treaty of Extradition between the United States of America and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 28 U.S.T. 227 ("the Treaty"): "In
urgent cases the person sought may, in accordance with the law of the requested Party,
be provisionally arrested on application through the diplomatic channel by the compe-
tent authorities of the requesting Party . .. ."
29. Matter of Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 272.
30. Id. § 3184 reads:
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United
States and any foreign government, any justice or judge of the United States,
or any magistrate authorized to do so by a court of the United States, or any
judge of a court of record of general jurisdiction of any State, may, upon
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States initiated deportation proceedings 1 against Doherty, who applied
for asylum. 2 Subsequently, Doherty requested that the deportation
proceeding and request for asylum be held in abeyance pending out-
come of the extradition action."3
In a December 12, 1984 decision, Judge Sprizzo ruled that Do-
herty's crimes in Belfast were "political offenses" within the meaning
of the Treaty 4 and that extradition was therefore barred. 5 With direct
appeal unavailable," the United States inexplicably failed to take the
procedural step available to it to overturn the judge's ruling,37 and in-
stead tried unsuccessfully to take the matter to the district court for
collateral review in a declaratory judgment action.38 District Judge
Haight dismissed the action, holding that "declaratory judgment has
no legitimate office to perform in extradition proceedings."3 9 The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal., 0
B. Doherty's Deportation Proceeding
Extradition having been denied, Attorney General Meese renewed
complaint made under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdic-
tion, with having committed within the jurisdiction of any such foreign gov-
ernment any of the crimes provided for by such treaty or convention, issue his
warrant for the apprehension of the person so charged, that he may be
brought before such justice, judge, or magistrate, to the end that the evidence
of criminality may be heard and considered. If on such hearing, he deems the
evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper
treaty or convention, he shall certify the same, together with a copy of all the
testimony taken before him, to the Secretary of State, that a warrant may
issue upon the requisition of such person, according to the stipulations of the
treaty or convention; and he shall issue his warrant for the commitment of the
person so charged to the proper jail, there to remain until such surrender shall
be made.
31. The deportation action was initiated pursuant to § 243(a) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a).
32. Doherty v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, INS, 908 F.2d 1108, 1111 (2d Cir. 1990).
33. Id.
34. Art. V(1)(c)(i) ("Extradition shall not be granted if the offense for which
extradition is requested is regarded by the requested Party as one of a political
character.").
35. Matter of Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 277.
36. See Matter of Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981) (denial of extradition is
unappealable).
37. See id. at 128 (the only way the government may challenge a denial of a writ
of extradition is to apply to a different judge).
38. United States v. Doherty, 615 F. Supp. 755, 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
39. Id. at 760.
40. United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1986).
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deportation proceedings against Doherty in September 1986.41 Do-
herty, availing himself of a prerogative provided for in the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, chose to designate the country to which
he would be deported.42 At a hearing before Immigration Judge (IJ)
Howard Cohen, Doherty withdrew his application for asylum, conceded
his deportability on the ground that he had entered the United States
without valid immigration documents,4" and designated the Republic of
Ireland (Ireland) as his country of deportation, where he faced a ten-
year sentence rather than the life sentence awaiting him in Northern
Ireland."'
The INS opposed Doherty's designation of Ireland on the ground
that deporting Doherty to Ireland rather than to the United Kingdom
would prejudice American interests in its relations with other nations
and the fight against international terrorism.45 Nonetheless, IJ Cohen
ordered Doherty deported to Ireland."" The INS appealed.4 7
C. Doherty's Habeas Corpus Petition
Immediately after IJ Cohen ordered Doherty deported to Ireland,
Doherty petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus seeking immediate de-
portation to Ireland. Doherty did so in an attempt to ensure his depor-
tation to Ireland before a supplemental extradition treaty between the
United States and the United Kingdom, virtually eliminating the politi-
cal offense exception, took effect."8 The district court denied Doherty's
petition, holding that the Attorney General was acting within his au-
thority in appealing the order directing Doherty's deportation to Ire-
land4 9 and that such deportation should not be carried out until the
41. Doherty v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, INS, 908 F.2d 1108, 1111 (2d Cir. 1990).
42. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (Supp. 1991).
43. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(1), 1182(a)(20) (1982).
44. Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d at 1111.
45. Doherty v. Meese, 808 F.2d 938, 940 (2d Cir. 1986).
46. For the text of the IJ's opinion, see Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at
156a, INS v. Doherty, 60 U.S.L.W. 4085 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1992) (No. 90-925) [hereinaf-
ter Appendix].
47. Doherty v. INS, 980 F.2d at 1111.
48. The new treaty retroactively eliminated the political offense exception for vio-
lent crimes, thus making Doherty extraditable. See Supplementary Treaty Concerning
Extradition Between the Government of the United States of America and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Jun. 25, 1985, Treaty Doc. 99-8.
49. "The deportation of an alien ... shall be directed by the Attorney General to
a country promptly designated by the alien if that country is willing to accept him into
its territory, unless the Attorney General, in his discretion, concludes that deportation
to such country would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States." 8 U.S.C. §
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INS appeal had been heard.5"
D. BIA Orders Doherty Deported to Ireland
On March 11, 1987, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) re-
jected the government's appeal and upheld IJ Cohen's deportation or-
der, declining to find that deportation to Ireland would be prejudicial to
the interests of the United States absent clear evidence of that conten-
tion.51 At the request of the INS, the BIA certified the case to Attor-
ney General Edwin Meese,52 who accepted the case for review in Octo-
ber, 1987.11
E. Doherty Moves to Reopen Deportation Proceedings
On December 3, 1987, with the case still pending before the At-
torney General, Doherty moved for the BIA to reopen his deportation
proceedings so that he could withdraw his designation of Ireland, redes-
ignate his country of deportation, and submit a new application for asy-
lum and withholding of deportation. 4 Doherty was once again reacting
to diplomatic events; Ireland had enacted a new law altering the appli-
cability of the political offense exception in extradition cases between
Council of Europe member states, including Britain.5 5 If Doherty were
deported to Ireland, under the new law he then would be subject to
extradition to the United Kingdom."6 Without deciding on the merits,
the BIA referred Doherty's request to Attorney General Meese. 57
F. Meese Orders Doherty Deported to the United Kingdom
The Attorney General announced his decision on June 9, 1988.58
Attorney General Meese, pursuant to his authority under § 243(a) of
1253(a) (Supp. 1991).
50. Doherty v. Meese, 808 F.2d 938, 941 (2d Cir. 1986).
51. Doherty v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, INS, 908 F.2d 1108, 1112 (2d Cir. 1990).
For the text of the BIA's decision, see Appendix, supra note 46, at 148a.
52. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h) permits the attorney general to review decisions of the BIA.
53. Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d at 1112.
54. Id.
55. The Extradition (European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism) Act
1987 took effect in Ireland on December 1, 1987, and implemented the terms of the
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, which had been adopted by the
Council of Europe in 1977. See WEINBERG & DAVIS, supra note 13, at 168.
56. Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d at 1112.
57. Id. For the text of the BIA's decision, see Appendix, supra note 46, at 131a.
58. Id. For the text of the Attorney General's decision, see Appendix, supra note
46, at 116a.
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the Immigration and Nationality Act, rejected Doherty's designation of
Ireland as his country of deportation as prejudicial to the United
States' interests.59 Rather, Meese ordered Doherty deported directly to
the United Kingdom."0 Finally, the Attorney General remanded Do-
herty's motion to reopen for consideration by the BIA."
G. The BIA Grants Doherty's Motion to Reopen
On November 14, 1988, the BIA granted Doherty's motion to reo-
pen his deportation proceedings, giving Doherty the opportunity to re-
apply for asylum and withholding of deportation. 62 The BIA based its
decision on "changed circumstances" since Doherty withdrew his appli-
cation for asylum, namely the redesignation of the United Kingdom by
the Attorney General as the country to which Doherty would be de-
ported and the change in Anglo-Irish extradition law. 63 Additionally,
the BIA held that Doherty had established a prima facie case for asy-
lum based on a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to the
United Kingdom. 6 Finally, the BIA denied Doherty's request to redes-
ignate his country of deportation.65 Subsequently, the BIA again certi-
fied the case to the attorney general for review at the request of the
INS. 66
H. Thornburgh Denies Doherty's Motion to Reopen;
Second Circuit Reverses
On June 30, 1989, Attorney General Richard.Thornburgh disap-
proved the BIA's decision and denied Doherty's motion to reopen asy-
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d at 1112.
62. Id. For the text of the BIA's decision, see Appendix, supra note 46, at 92a.
63. Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d at 1112.
64. Id. at 1112-13. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (Supp. 1991) gives the Attorney General
discretion to grant asylum to any alien physically present in the United States whom
the Attorney General determines to be a refugee. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (Supp.
1991) defines "refugee" as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person's nationality, or, in
the case of a person having no nationality, is unable or unwilling to return to,
and is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or
a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . ..
(emphasis added).
65. Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d at 1111-12.
66. Id. at 1113.
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lum proceedings.6 " On June 29, 1990, the Second Circuit affirmed At-
torney General Meese's order rejecting Ireland as Doherty's country of
deportation and ordering Doherty deported to the United Kingdom and
reversed Attorney General Thornburgh's order denying Doherty's mo-
tion to reopen his deportation proceedings.6 8
I. The Supreme Court Reverses the Second Circuit
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 69 and ruled on January 15,
1992, reversing the Second Circuit on narrow procedural grounds. It
held that Attorney General Thornburgh did not abuse his discretion in
denying Doherty's motion to reopen his deportation proceedings.7" Left
for another case were several issues raised by the court of appeals,
71
namely what international law requires of the United States' asylum
and deportation laws and what role, if any, the United States' foreign
policy interests may play in the execution of those laws. The Court's
opinion will be explained more fully in the discussion to follow of
United States asylum and deportation law. Furthermore, even though
the Supreme. Court did not discuss the merits of the government's
failed attempt to extradite Doherty,72 because the Court placed its im-
primatur on the government's strategy of accomplishing through depor-
tation what it could not accomplish through extradition, 73 a brief anal-
ysis of extradition will inform this discussion.
67. Id. For the text of the Attorney General's decision, see Appendix, supra note
46, at 46a.
68. Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d at 1113-14.
69. INS v. Doherty, 111 S. Ct. 950 (1991).
70. INS v. Doherty, 60 U.S.L.W. 4085 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1992).
71. Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1990).
72. The district court's denial of the government's attempt to extradite Doherty
was not properly before the Court; indeed such denial is not subject to appellate review.
See Matter of Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981) "[T]he Government's only remedy
following denial of an extradition request is to refile the request with another immigra-
tion magistrate .. " United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 495 (2d Cir. 1986). The
Supreme Court has never addressed the political offense exception. See Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Ahmad: Profile of an Extradition Case, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
723, 749 (1991) [hereinafter Lowenfeld].
73. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204, 213 (2d Cir. 1991) (Altimari, J., dis-
senting). See also Respondent's Brief at 3, INS v. Doherty, 60 U.S.L.W. 4085 (U.S.
Jan. 14 1992) (No. 90-925) (quoting an INS district director as having said, "[I]n the
extradition proceeding the objective was to get Doherty to the United Kingdom. And in
the deportation proceeding our objective is to get him to the United Kingdom. This is
just an alternate means to accomplish that.").
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III. EXTRADITION AND THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION
Few areas of extradition law have evoked as much controversy in
recent years as the political offense exception.7 To understand the con-
troversy it is necessary to examine the historical development of the
exception.
When nation-states were governed by monarchs and absolute rul-
ers, extradition was reserved for political offenders rather than common
criminals.7 With the American and French revolutions came a new
application of the political offense exception. For example, the United
States Declaration of Independence guaranteed the right of the people
to alter or abolish any form of government that threatened liberty.78
The new democracy saw political offenders as those fugitives most de-
serving of protection from extradition." Political offenders were seen to
be "heroically fighting tyrannical governments at best and committing
government at worst."'78 Therefore, rather than being used to punish
74. See, e.g., Barbara Ann Banoff & Christopher H. Pyle, "To Surrender Politi-
cal Offenders": The Political Offense Exception to Extradition in United States Law,
16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 169 (1984) [hereinafter Banoff & Pyle]; M. Cherif
Bassiouni, The "Political Offense Exception" Revisited: Extradition Between the U.S.
and the U.K. - A Choice Between Friendly Cooperation Among Allies and Sound Law
and Policy, 15 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 255 (1987) [hereinafter Bassiouni];
Lowenfeld, supra note 72; Michelle M. Cain, Recent Decision, Abrogating the Rela-
tive Political Offense Exception to Extradition: The United States-United Kingdom
Supplementary Extradition Treaty, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 453 (1987) [hereinafter
Cain]; Nancy M. Green, Note, In the Matter of the Extradition of Atta: Limiting the
Scope of the Political Offense Exception, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 447 (1991); Lloyd W.
Grooms and Jane M. Samson, Note, The Political Offense Exception to Extradition: A
19th Century British Standard in 20th Century American Courts, 59 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1005 (1984) [hereinafter Grooms & Samson]; Note, Political Legitimacy in the
Law of Political Asylum, 99 HARV. L. REV. 450 (1985) [hereinafter Political Legiti-
macy]; Miriam E. Sapiro, Note, Extradition in an Era of Terrorism: The Need to
Abolish the Political Offense Exception, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 654 (1986) [hereinafter
Sapiro].
75. BARBARA M. YARNOLD, INTERNATIONAL FUGITIVES: A NEW ROLE FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 12 (1991). See also Grooms & Samson, supra
note 74, at 1008.
76. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
77. President Franklin Pierce's Secretary of State William Marcy wrote in 1853:
"To surrender political offenders ... is not a duty; but on the contrary, compliance
with such a demand would be considered a dishonorable subserviency to a foreign
power, and an act meriting the reprobation of mankind." Mr. Marcy, Secretary of
State, to Mr. Huslemann, Sept. 26, 1853. Sec. Doc., 33rd Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 1, 34
(quoted in Banoff & Pyle, supra note 74, at 169). See also Quinn v. Robinson, 783
F.2d 776, 792 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
78. Banoff & Pyle, supra note 74, at 180-81. Banoff & Pyle suggest that eight-
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political offenders and ensure continued authoritarian rule, the political
offense exception became a tool of democracies to protect those who
would abolish despotic regimes in favor of democracy in other
nations.7 9
Extradition in American law means "the surrender of a criminal
by a foreign state to which he has fled to refuge from prosecution to the
state within whose jurisdiction the crime was committed upon the de-
mand of the latter state, in order that he may be dealt with according
to its laws."8 Most nations, including the United States, will comply
with a request for extradition only if there is an extradition treaty in
force between the two nations. 81 While extradition treaties are wide-
spread within the world community,82 there is no universal definition of
"political offense." 83 Three reasons have been given for this. First, do-
mestic courts view extradition as purely a matter of domestic law so
that each state is entitled to define the parameters of what constitutes a
political offense. Second, the question of whether an offense is political
is determined by factors too numerous to describe or define. The second
reason perhaps explains the third, that historically treaties have not de-
fined "political offense."84
While there is no concrete definition of political offense, the inter-
national community recognizes, and gives varying protection to, two
categories of offenses: purely political and relative political offenses.85
A purely political offense comprises acts against the state that have no
element of a common crime. In other words, a fugitive is accused of
directly injuring a right of the government.86 Characterization as
purely political offenses has been limited to treason, sedition, and espio-
nage.87 These crimes are generally regarded as non-extraditable of-
eenth century proponents of the political offense exception benefitted from the practice
not only for moral reasons but for practical ones: "[G]overnments rose and fell with
sufficient frequency to warrant not taking sides. When today's refugee can be to-
morrow's head of state, and vice versa, a neutral principle of non-intervention may best
serve the interests of the asylum state." Id. at 181.
79. Grooms & Samson, supra note 74, at 1008.
80. Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902).
81. Grooms & Samson, supra note 74, at 1008.
82. The United States is party to approximately 100 bilateral extradition treaties.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3181. The United States is also a party to the Multilateral Convention
on Extradition signed at Montevideo on Dec. 26, 1933, to which most South and Cen-
tral American states are parties. 49 Stat. 3111, T.S. No. 882, 165 L.N.T.S. 45.
83. Sapiro, supra note 74, at 660.
84. Garcia-Mora, supra note 6, at 1229-30.
85. Id.
86. Grooms & Samson, supra note 74, at 1009.
87. Garcia-Mora, supra note 6, at 1234.
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fenses. 88 Relative political offenses, on the other hand, are common
crimes committed with a political motivation or purpose. 89
The distinction between purely political and relative political of-
fenses leaves courts with difficulties of classification. If a court deems
an offense purely political, the offender is non-extraditable. If the act
was a relative political offense, however, the court must still decide if it
was sufficiently political to prohibit extradition.9" The task of the court
in classifying an offense as pure or relative is complicated by the fact
that some acts generally considered purely political also injure individ-
ual rights.91 Additionally, the court is often faced with mixed motives
of the offender: a political intent plus some other interest, such as ven-
geance or greed. 92 The relative political offense presents courts with the
troubling dilemma of punishing the offender for the common crime
while respecting the principle of the political offense exception.93
The relative political offense also presents courts with the inquiry
as to how much of a connection there must be between a common
crime and the political motivation so that the offender may invoke the
political offense exception. Joseph Doherty's case is an example of this
inquiry, and Judge Sprizzo's resolution of the problem raises the ques-
tion of the appropriate test to use in determining political offenses.
Judge Sprizzo began by rejecting Doherty's contention that all he
need show to establish a political offense is that there was a political
conflict in Northern Ireland and that his offense was committed during
the course of and in furtherance of that conflict.9" Judge Sprizzo em-
88. Sapiro, supra note 74, at 660.
89. Grooms & Samson, supra note 74, at 1009.
90. See, e.g., Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1067 (2d Cir. 1990)("Whether an
extraditee is accused of an offense of a political nature is an issue for judicial
determination.").
91. Sapiro, supra note 74, at 660.
92. For example, Sapiro discusses the pecuniary incentives of espionage. Id. at
660.
93. The Supplementary Extradition Treaty Between the United States and the
United Kingdom solves the problem by effectively eliminating the relative political of-
fense exception in extradition cases between the United States and Britain. See gener-
ally Cain, supra note 74, and Bassiouni, supra note 74.
94. Matter of Doherty by Gov't of United Kingdom, 599 F. Supp. 270, 274
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); but see In re Mackin, 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54 at 49-74 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
13, 1981), appeal dismissed, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981)(magistrate determined
Mackin's offenses were political because (1) at the time of the offenses PIRA was
conducing a political uprising in Belfast; (2) Mackin was an active member of PIRA;
and (3) the offenses were incidental to Mackin's role in the uprising); see also Quinn v.
Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986); Matter of
Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
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phasized that "not every act committed for a political purpose or dur-
ing a political disturbance may or should properly be regarded as a
political offense.""
Rather, Sprizzo said the court must examine the nature of the act,
the context in which it was committed, the status of the offender, the
nature of the organization on whose behalf the offense was committed,
and the place where the offense took place.96 However, the test not-
withstanding, no act may be regarded as political where the nature of
the act is violative of international law and "inconsistent with interna-
tional standards of civilized conduct."9
Applying the test to Doherty's offense, Sprizzo found that Captain
Westmacott's murder occurred in the course of the "troubles" in
Northern Ireland, thus meeting the context and place prongs of the
test.9 8 Sprizzo felt the need for further definition of the organization
prong, however, because he was reluctant to confer legitimacy on the
PIRA and its goals. 9 Therefore Sprizzo felt constrained to examine the
nature of PIRA, its structure, and its mode of internal discipline, in
95. Matter of Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 274. Judge Sprizzo's reasoning here dis-
cussed late 20th century "offenses" that could be characterized as political under the
interpretation urged by Doherty:
Surely the atrocities at Dachau, Aushwitz, and other death camps would be
arguably political within the meaning of that definition. The same would be
true of My Lai, the Bataan death march, Lidice, the Katyn Forest Massacre,
and a whole host of violations of international law that the civilized world is,
has been and should be unwilling to accept. Indeed, the Nuremberg trials
would have no legitimacy or meaning if any act done for a political purpose
could be properly classified as a political offense.
Id. While Judge Sprizzo's reasoning is wholly in line with the primary purpose of the
political offense exception-protection of the right to promote political change-some
Circuits have not so viewed the exception. See Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198
(9th Cir. 1957), affig. Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F. Supp. 254 (S.D. Cal. 1956), vacated,
355 U.S. 393 (1958)(holding that an alleged war criminal's murder of thousands of
civilians during World War II was a political offense).
96. Matter of Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 275.
97. Id. at 274.
98. Id. at 276.
99. "[I]t would be most unwise as a matter of policy to extend the benefit of the
political offense exception to every fanatic group or individual with loosely defined po-
litical objectives who commit acts of violence in the name of those so called political
objectives." Id. Judge Sprizzo's careful analysis nonetheless came under attack for
"sweepingly conferr[ing] upon the IRA the political and military status that has been
denied it not only by the British government but by the government of the. Irish Repub-
lic. The judge gave American blessing to the myth that the IRA is engaged in a war of
liberation to free Ulster from British rule .... " Sanctuary for Murderers, CH. TRIB.,
Jan. 12, 1985, at 12.
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deciding whether offenses of its members may be deemed political.1"'
Sprizzo determined that the PIRA had an organization, internal disci-
pline, and a command structure.01 On these facts, Sprizzo found the
PIRA to be such an organization that acts of its members may be con-
sidered political.102
Furthermore, Sprizzo found the United States' argument that the
PIRA was unlikely to achieve its goals irrelevant to the determination
of Doherty's crime as a political offense. 103 Not only would such a de-
termination require premonitory judgments by the court, but, accord-
ing to Judge Sprizzo, "[h]istory is replete with examples of political
and insurrectionary movements that have succeeded in effecting politi-
cal changes that were believed to be improbable if not impossible."104
Applying the test, Sprizzo found that the act of murdering an
army captain during an uprising designed to effect political change in a
place where hostilities were rampant by an active member of an organi-
zation devoted to political revolt was a political offense. 0 5 Further-
more, Judge Sprizzo found that Doherty's act, while "most tragic," did
not transcend the limits of international law.' 06
Judge Sprizzo's decision marked the fourth time in history that a
United States federal court had found an IRA member to be non-ex-
traditable because his offenses were political. 10 7 While IRA members
100. Matter of Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 276.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 277.
106. Id. at 275.
107. See Matter of Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981) (Desmond Mackin, a
PIRA member, was indicted in Northern Ireland for attempted murder of a British
soldier. He jumped bail and was arrested in the United States. A magistrate found that
Mackin's offense fell within the political offense exception, and that he was, therefore,
not extraditable); McMullen v. INS, 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986) (Peter McMullen
was sought by the United Kingdom for the bombing of a military barracks. A magis-
trate found the offense of which McMullen was accused to be political); Quinn v.
Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986) (William Quinn
was wanted in the United Kingdom for the murder of a police constable and for send-
ing letter bombs to a Catholic bishop, a judge, and a newspaper publisher. Quinn was
also implicated in the failed bombings of a pub, a restaurant, and a railway station in
England. A magistrate found that Quinn's offenses did not fall within the political
offense exception because, inter alia, they were directed at civilians. Quinn challenged
the magistrate's ruling through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the district
court, which held that the magistrate had erred and that Quinn's offenses were politi-
cal. The Ninth Circuit reversed, and Quinn was extradited).
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have been found to be political offenders, members of other terrorist
organizations have not been so designated. For example, Palestinian
terrorists have not fared well before United States courts. In Eain v.
Wilkes,1"8 the Seventh Circuit found that a member of the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) accused of bombing a marketplace in
Israel, killing two children and injuring thirty others, was not a politi-
cal offender." 9 The court differentiated between acts directed at the
social structure of a nation and acts directed at its political structure."1 '
A bombing of civilian targets, despite a political objective, is not a po-
litical offense.' Another Palestinian, Mahmound El-Abed Ahmad,
was charged with attacking a bus filled with civilians in the occupied
West Bank. 2 He too was found to have committed a non-political of-
fense and was certified extraditable." 13
The distinction between the cases of the Irish and Palestinian of-
fenders appears to be that the targets in the cases of the Irish were
military, while the Palestinians' targets were civilian. However, under
this analysis, Doherty should not be protected by the political offense
exception because, while his murder victim was military, he also held a
civilian family hostage in their home.11" Yet the district court found
Doherty's offenses to be political. In contrast, William Quinn, who, like
Doherty, was accused of committing acts against military and civilian
targets, was found to be extraditable. 5 The conflicting results in the
cases of Quinn and Doherty, and the seeming inconsistency of reason-
ing between the cases of Palestinian and Irish offenders, illustrates the
shortcomings of the political. offense exception as it is applied in Ameri-
can courts."' Its application results in an inconsistent body of law that
108. 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
109. Id. at 518.
110. Id. at 520-21.
111. Id. at 504.
112. Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), affid, 910 F.2d 1063
(2d Cir. 1990).
113. Id.
114. Matter of Doherty by Gov't of United Kingdom, 599 F. Supp. 270, 272
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
115. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 818 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882
(1986).
116. The United States government has sought to clarify the political offense ex-
ception in its Supplementary Treaty of Extradition with the United Kingdom. See
supra note 48. The supplementary treaty excludes from the definition of "political of-
fense" a host of crimes, including hijacking, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, and
use of explosives. Id. art. 1. For an analysis of the supplementary treaty, see Bassiouni,
supra note 74. For a discussion of alternate methods the United States could have
adopted to better define the political offense exception, see Cain, supra note 74, at 474-
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gives little guidance to the judges who must apply the law, to the na-
tions that would seek to extradite offenders under the law, and to the
revolutionaries seeking protection under the law. In Doherty's case, the
government was confronted by a terrorist whom it could not extradite
and an ally government demanding his return. To solve its conundrum
the government sought to accomplish through deportation what it could
not through extradition.117 The propriety of the government's strategy
of appropriating the essentially humanitarian process of asylum to
achieve foreign policy goals will be discussed below.
IV. ASYLUM AND DEPORTATION
As discussed above, when the United States instituted deportation
proceedings against him, Doherty invoked his right under 8 U.S.C. §
1253(a) and designated his country of deportation as Ireland. In oppos-
ing such designation, the United States took the first step in what
would become an increasingly politicized effort to return Joseph Do-
herty to the United Kingdom. The entry of foreign policy considera-
tions into this legal battle made Joseph Doherty something of a cause
c&lbre 8 and called into question whether the United States system of
81.
While the treaty will operate to ensure that the United States will not be barred
from delivering to the United Kingdom IRA escapees who have committed crimes of
violence, the Senate may have gone too far in drafting the treaty to apply retroactively
to McMullen, Doherty, and Mackin, District Judge Robert Ward held that McMullen
may not be extradited under the supplemental treaty because the treaty as applied to
McMullen is an unconstitutional bill of attainder. Matter of Extradition of McMullen,
769 F. Supp. 1278, 1290 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), affd, Nos. 91-2402, 91-2420, 1992 U.S.
App. LEXIS 210 (2d Cir. Jan. 7, 1992)(citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 and § 10,
cl. 1). Judge Ward held that the legislative history of the treaty indicated that the
Senate intended to single out McMullen, Doherty, and Mackin for punishment, and
therefore the treaty violates the Constitution if applied to McMullen. Id. at 1287. The
court indicated that the United States probably could not extradite Doherty or Mackin
under the new treaty either. Id. at 1286, 1289.
117. See Brief of Amicus Curiae International Human Rights Law Group at 40-
41, INS v. Doherty, 60 U.S.L.W. 4085 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1992) (No. 90-925) [hereinafter
IHRLG] ("[T]he Attorney General here is claiming the ... authority to manipulate
the deportation laws to effectively return an alleged malefactor to a foreign government
for the express purpose of imposing punishment - without the safeguards and judicial
review imposed by congress through extradition treaties and procedures.").
118. Amnesty International founder and Nobel Prize winner Sean McBride testi-
fied against Doherty's extradition. Reuters, Mar. 26, 1984, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, OMNI file. City councils of Long Beach, New York, Baltimore, Chicago,
Medford, Mass., and Carteret, N.J. passed resolutions calling for Doherty's release.
Elizabeth Wasserman, Council Urges Release of IRA Prisoner, NEWSDAY, Sept. 20,
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handling asylum cases comports with its obligations under international
law. ' 19
A. Statutory Provisions Relating to Asylum and Deportation
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's ruling granting
Doherty's motion to reopen his deportation case so that he might apply
for asylum and for withholding of deportation, two separate forms of
relief. 2 ' The attorney general is authorized to withhold deportation of
an alien to any country where he would be subject to persecution on
account of race, religion, or political opinion. 2' Doherty invoked that
provision, proving to the BIA's satisfaction a well-founded fear of per-
secution for his political opinions if he was returned to Northern Ire-
land. 22 In addition to § 1253(h) authorizing withholding of deporta-
tion, § 208(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
authorizes the attorney general to grant asylum to an alien who demon-
strates a well-founded fear of persecution.2 3 While both types of relief
rest on the alien's ability to prove a well-founded fear of persecution,
the attorney general's discretion differs for the two types of relief.
Withholding of deportation is mandatory, providing the attorney
general no discretion once the alien has shown a clear probability that
he would be persecuted if returned to a particular country, so long as
the alien avoids the four exclusion clauses of 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2). 12 4
Thus, even if the deportee establishes a prima facie case of persecution,
the attorney general may deny withholding if: (1) the alien persecuted
others for their political beliefs;125 (2) the alien poses a danger to the
1989, at 31. New York City Mayor David Dinkins named a street corner in Manhat-
tan after Doherty. See McCrystal, supra note 10, at 23. Doherty was named honorary
chairman of St. Patrick's Day parades across the country. See, e.g., Mark A. Uhlig,
Gunman of the IRA: A 5-Year Wait, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1988; IRA Member Denied
Jail Leave for Parade, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 13, 1988, at 10. Doherty was visited in prison
by John Cardinal O'Connor, former hostage Father Lawrence Jenco, and Rev. Jesse
Jackson. See McCrystal, supra note 10, at 23. Finally, 132 members of Congress filed
an amicus brief on Doherty's behalf with the Supreme Court. Brief of Amiei Curiae'
Members of the United States Senate and Members of the United States House of
Representatives, INS v. Doherty, 60 U.S.L.W. 4085 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1992) (No. 90-925)
[hereinafter Mermbers of Congress].
119. See Protocol, supra note 7.
120. Doherty v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, INS, 908 F.2d 1108, 1114 (2d Cir. 1990).
121. Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp. 1991).
122. Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d at 1113.
123. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(Supp. 1991).
124. Id.
125. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(A)(Supp. 1991).
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people of the United States; 26 (3) the alien committed a serious
nonpolitical crime outside the United States; 117 or (4) the alien is re-
garded as dangerous to national security.' 28 Withholding of deportation
is a limited form of relief, enjoining deportation only to the nation
where the alien faces persecution but not to a non-threatening third
nation. 12 9
Asylum is a broader form of relief. If granted, the alien may re-
main in the United States and apply for permanent residence. 30 A
grant of asylum, however, is within the discretion of the attorney gen-
eral.' Therefore, even if the alien meets the statutory definition of
"refugee," the attorney general may nonetheless deny asylum. 32
B. Attorney General Meese's Order
Attorney General Meese opposed Doherty's designation of Ireland
as his country of deportation because it would be prejudicial to the
United State's interests for two reasons: (1) United States policy calls
for "swift and lawful" punishment of those who commit violence
against democratic states, therefore it was in the United States' inter-
ests to return Doherty to Northern Ireland where he would be subject
to a life sentence; and (2) deporting Doherty to Ireland rather than
Northern Ireland would damage United States-United Kingdom rela-
tions.' 3 The Second Circuit held that Attorney General Meese was
126. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B)(Supp. 1991).
127. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(C)(Supp. 1991).
128. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(D)(Supp. 1991).
129. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (Supp. 1991).
130. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (Supp. 1991).
131. Id.
132. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42) & 1158(a) (Supp. 1991).
133. Doherty v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, INS, 908 F.2d 1103, 1113 (2d Cir. 1990).
Attorney General Meese apparently had good reason to believe that failing to extradite
Doherty would injure United States-United Kingdom relations. The United States
ratified the supplemental treaty in response to warnings by former Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher that the failure of the United States to extradite IRA members
"was becoming a major issue between the two nations." Ronald Sullivan, U.S. Court
Blocks I.R.A. Extradition, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1992, at A7. Former President Rea-
gan expressly stated that he wanted the supplemental treaty passed as repayment for
Britain allowing United States bombers to take off from Britain to bomb Libya in
1986. Reagan Pushes for Extradition Treaty, UPI, May 31, 1986, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI file. According to a book review of a new book by Martin
Dillon; an expert on the troubles in Northern Ireland, Dillon was present when a Brit-
ish diplomat told Justice Department officials that, "[t]he Prime Minister believes you
owe us this one. She allowed your government to use our territory for your F-1lls
when they were on their way to bomb Tripoli." McCrystal, supra note 10, at 23. Dillon
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within his authority to oppose Doherty's designation;'"" Congress gave
the attorney general broad discretion to determine what constitutes
prejudice to national interests. 13 5 The Second Circuit recognized the
decision as requiring an "essentially political determination" that is un-
reviewable by a court. 3
C. Attorney General Thornburgh's Order
Attorney General Thornburgh denied Doherty's motion to reo-
pen.3  Doherty had relied on three grounds for reopening: (1) that At-
torney General Meese's decision ordering Doherty deported to the
United Kingdom rather than to Ireland was an "unforeseen adverse
administrative decision, constituting a 'new fact;' " (2) that the change
in Anglo-Irish extradition law also constituted a new fact; and (3) that
there was new and material evidence relating to the persecution he
would face were Doherty deported to Northern Ireland.' 38 The Attor-
ney General rejected all three grounds. 139 As for the first argument, the
Attorney General found that Meese's order that Doherty be deported
to Northern Ireland was not unforeseen because Doherty knew the At-
torney General had statutory authority to deny Doherty's designation
of Ireland as the country to which he would be deported. 40 Also, the
INS had consistently taken the position that it opposed deporting Do-
herty to any country except the United Kingdom.' 4 ' Finally, Attorney
General Thornburgh commented that he doubted whether an attorney
general's decision to redesignate the country of deportation could ever
be considered "new evidence.' 42
As for Doherty's argument that the new Irish law that would al-
low for his extradition to the United Kingdom was a new fact, Thorn-
also related that as recently as 1990, Prime Minister Thatcher had sent lobbyists to
Washington to pressure the Bush administration to return Doherty. Id.
134. Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d at 1113-14.
135. Id. at 1113; 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (Supp. 1991).
136. Doherty v. Meese, 808 F.2d 938, 943-44 (2d Cir. 1986).
137. Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d at 1113.
138. In re Doherty, Mem. Att'y Gen. (Jun. 30, 1989), reprinted in Appendix,
supra note 46, at 56a-57a. The new evidence Doherty submitted consisted of a report
by Amnesty International concerning the treatment of IRA prisoners by British secur-
ity forces, an affidavit from Doherty's mother Maureen describing recent harassment of
her family and friends by the security forces, and an affidavit from Doherty's counsel.
Id. at 57a-58a.
139. Id. at 58a-60a.
140. See 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (Supp. 1991).
141. Appendix, supra note 46, at 58a.
142. Id. at 58a.
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burgh found that, even if the new law were a change in fact, it was
immaterial because Attorney General Meese had ordered Doherty de-
ported to the United Kingdom. As such, any change in Irish law was
immaterial.' 43 Also, Attorney General Thornburgh found that, when he
designated Ireland as his country of deportation, Doherty knew the
change in law was imminent because in 1985 Ireland had expressed its
intention to sign the European Convention on the Suppression of Ter-
rorism, which was implemented in Ireland by the Extradition Act of
1987.1"" Finally, Attorney General Thornburgh also rejected Doherty's
"new" evidence, finding that it had been available at the time of Do-
herty's earlier proceedings or that it was immaterial.
145
Attorney General Thornburgh cited as an additional ground for
denying Doherty's motion to reopen that Doherty had waived his
claims to asylum and withholding of deportation when he conceded de-
143. Id. at 59a.
144. Id. The Attorney General rested his determination that the change in Irish
law was foreseeable on the fact that Ireland had in 1985 announced its intention to sign
the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism ("European Convention"),
which eviscerated the political offense exception to extradition between member states.
However, that announcement did not necessarily mean that adoption of the Convention
into Irish law was imminent. Ireland signed the European Convention in February,
1986. This had no force or effect in Irish law, however, until the Irish Parliament
enacted implementing legislation, and as of 1986 when Doherty designated Ireland,
such legislation was very much in doubt. Ireland had agreed to sign the European
Convention as part of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. Anglo-Irish Agreement,
Nov. 15, 1985, Ireland-U.K., 24 I.L.M. 1597 ("the Agreement")(The Agreement es-
tablished a system for addressing political, legal, and security issues in Northern Ire-
land). However, the Agreement, and thus Ireland's promise to sign the European Con-
vention, was on shaky ground from the beginning. First, Unionists and Loyalists in
Northern Ireland launched a campaign of rioting and protests to destroy the Agree-
ment. This strategy had worked to dismantle a similar agreement in 1974. Second, the
legality of the Agreement had been challenged in Ulster courts. Third, the opposition
leader in Ireland, who was expected to take office during the term of the Agreement,
opposed it and announced that he would renegotiate it. Thus, when Doherty designated
Ireland in 1986, the continued existence of the Anglo-Irish Agreement was in doubt.
In addition to doubts about the Anglo-Irish Agreement, there was no guarantee
that the Irish Parliament would enact the legislation necessary to enact the European
Convention. Enactment was conditioned upon changes in the legal system of Northern
Ireland, and the Irish Parliament refused to enact the legislation until the reforms took
place. Even after the Irish Parliament passed the Extradition Act, the effective date
clause contained numerous contingencies, making the effective date uncertain. Thus, it
is arguable that Doherty could not have foreseen that Irish law would change so as to
mandate his extradition to Northern Ireland. Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil
Liberties Union and American Immigration Lawyers Association at 14-17, INS v. Do-
herty, 60 U.S.L.W. 4085 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1992) (No. 90-925) [hereinafter ACLU].
145. Appendix, supra note 46, at 59a.
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portability and designated Ireland in September 1986.16 The Attorney
General described Doherty's decision as "part of a calculated plan to
ensure immediate deportation to Ireland before the United Kingdom
ratified its treaty with the United States . . ,1.. The Attorney Gen-
eral concluded that it was in the interests of the administrative process
to hold to the consequences of his tactical decisions any deportee who
makes such decisions with the advice and assistance of counsel.
14 8
Thornburgh cited, as the final reason for denying Doherty's motion
to reopen, that Doherty would not ultimately be entitled to the relief he
sought from the new hearing, asylum and withholding of deporta-
tion. 14 '9 Dealing with the asylum claim first, Thornburgh pointed out
that a grant of asylum is within the attorney general's discretion, and
that in his view, Doherty would not be entitled to asylum even if he
could make out a prima facie case of his refugee status. 150 First, the
Attorney General stated that it was the policy of the United States to
ensure that those who commit acts of violence against democratic
states should be punished.15 1 Second, the State Department had specifi-
cally stated that Doherty's deportation to the United Kingdom was in
the United States' interests. 52 Third, Doherty had waived his asylum
claim in 1986.111 Finally, Thornburgh found that Doherty's member-
ship and participation in PIRA suggested that he was not "deserving of
equitable relief." '54
As for Doherty's withholding of deportation claim, the Attorney
General found Doherty would ultimately be ineligible for such relief.1 5
5
Thornburgh held that Doherty would be unable to clear two statutory
hurdles: (1) to prove that he was eligible under the inclusion clause of 8
U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) because he would face persecution on account of
his political opinions were he returned to Northern Ireland, and (2) to
prove that he was not excluded from withholding because he had com-
mitted serious nonpolitical crimes and/or had persecuted others be-
cause of their political beliefs.
The Attorney General did not specifically discuss Doherty's claim
146. Id. at 60a.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 60a-61a.
150. Id. at 82a.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 83a.
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that he would be persecuted if he were returned to the United King-
dom. Instead, the Attorney General discussed the two grounds upon
which Doherty would be excluded from relief. First, the Attorney Gen-
eral found there were " 'serious reasons for considering that [Doherty]
has committed a serious nonpolitical crime . . .'"'" Adopting the
analysis of the Ninth Circuit in McMullen, 1 7 the Attorney General
found that Doherty's acts satisfied the McMullen test for a serious
nonpolitical crime in that there was a "'close and direct causal link
between the crime committed and its alleged political purpose and ob-
ject,' " and that either Doherty's acts were disproportionate to the ob-
jective or were atrocious or barbarous. 158 As support for this conten-
tion, Thornburgh cited the, official position of the United States
government that PIRA was a terrorist organization. 1 59 Thornburgh
considered relevant that, in McMullen's hearing before the BIA, the
INS had introduced "substantial evidence" of PIRA's violent attacks
against civilians. 6 ' The Attorney General concluded that PIRA's "ran-
dom acts of violence" constituted serious nonpolitical crimes, and, be-
cause he had probable cause to believe Doherty had committed such
crimes, Doherty was excluded from withholding relief by 8 U.S.C. §
1253(h)(2)(C).' 6 ' The Attorney General found that Doherty's mem-
bership and participation in PIRA, standing alone, was sufficient to
constitute probable cause.
6 2
The Attorney General also found that Doherty would be ineligible
for withholding of deportation because of the second ground, that Do-
herty had "'assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of...
person[s] on account of. . . political opinion.' "163 The Attorney Gen-
eral once again based his determination on Doherty's membership in
PIRA, "an organization that the BIA found has killed or attempted to
kill those who politically oppose its activities.' 6 4 Specifically, the At-
torney General cited Doherty's role as a PIRA officer, responsible for
distributing weapons and training PIRA soldiers. 165 Attorney General
156. Id.
157. McMullen v. INS, 788 F.2d 591, 595, 597 (9th Cir. 1986).
158. Appendix, supra note 46, at 84a.
159. id.
160. Id. at 85a (citing Matter of McMullen, Interim Dec. 2967 (BIA May 25,
1984).
161. Appendix, supra note 46, at 85a.
162. Id. at 87a.
163. Id. at 89a (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(A) (Supp. 1991)).
164. Appendix, supra note 46, at 89a (citing Matter of McMullen, Interim Dec.
2967 (BIA May 25, 1984)).
165. Appendix, supra note 46, at 89a.
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Thornburgh concluded, "[t]hese facts establish by ample evidence that
[Doherty] would be ineligible for withholding because of his participa-
tion in the PIRA's persecution of political opponents.""'6 In sum, the
Attorney General reversed the BIA and held that Doherty would not
ultimately be entitled to withholding or asylum; therefore, he was not
entitled to reopen his deportation proceedings. 167
D. The Second Circuit Reverses Attorney General Thornburgh
The Second Circuit upheld Attorney General Meese's order redes-
ignating Doherty's country of deportation as the United Kingdom, es-
sentially because the Attorney General's finding that failure to deport
Doherty to the United Kingdom would prejudice United States' inter-
ests is "'essentially unreviewable' by a court." 1 8 As for the Thorn-
burgh decision, the Second Circuit held that, while the asylum decision
is discretionary with the attorney general, his discretion is not com-
pletely unfettered. "[I]t is a fundamental principle of our immigration
law that the attorney general must base his discretionary decisions only
on the 'legitimate concerns' of the relevant statutory provision."16 9
Thus, the Second Circuit found that Attorney General Thornburgh had
abused his discretion by denying Doherty's motion to reopen.'
First, the court addressed the Attorney General's statement that
"[iut is unnecessary for me to address (and I do not) the question
whether [Doherty] has established a prima facie case for the substan-
tive relief sought."'' Because the denial of a motion to reopen may be
upheld only on the grounds relied upon in the Attorney General's deci-
sion, Circuit Judge Pratt assumed, as had the BIA, that Doherty had
met his burden of demonstrating prima facie eligibility for relief.172
Next, the court discussed the Attorney General's finding that Do-
herty was ineligible for reopening because he had failed to prove a
change in circumstances. 7 The court held that Thornburgh relied on a
mistaken view of the law when he determined that both Attorney Gen-
eral Meese's redesignation of the United Kingdom as the country of
deportation and the change in Anglo-Irish extradition law constituted
166. Id.
167. Id. at 91a.
168. Doherty v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, INS, 908 F.2d 1108, 1113 (2d Cir. 1990)
(quoting Doherty v. Meese, 808 F.2d 938, 944 (2d Cir. 1986)).
169. Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d at 1117.
170. Id. at 1115.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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foreseeable circumstances. 1 4 The court held that, "[n]either the regu-
lations nor the applicable decisional law require expressly or by impli-
cation that the new evidence be 'unforeseeable' . . . ."17 Further, even
if the law required unforeseeability of the new evidence, the court
doubted that Doherty's changed circumstances were as foreseeable as
Attorney General Thornburgh purported. 1 6 The court noted that no
attorney general had ever rejected an alien's designation of country of
deportation on the ground of prejudice to United States' interests, thus
the Attorney General's action could hardly have been foreseeable.
177
The court found the decision of Attorney General Meese and the
change in Irish law to be sufficiently changed circumstances to satisfy
Doherty's burden that he produce new evidence and explain his with-
drawal of his original application for asylum. 78 The court found that
Thornburgh abused his discretion when he denied reopening on the ba-
sis of a different view of the facts than the BIA had developed, and
because he applied an erroneous requirement of foreseeability.1 79
The court next addressed Thornburgh's finding that Doherty was
ineligible for withholding of deportation. The court found that, because
withholding of deportation is mandatory once an alien establishes stat-
utory eligibility, a determination of a deportee's ultimate entitlement to
relief is improper in the context of a motion to reopen. 180 The court
cited INS v. Abudu1 8' for the proposition that the attorney general's
power to deny a motion to reopen for reasons other than the alien's
failure to establish a prima facie case of entitlement to relief or to pro-
vide new, material evidence is restricted to grants of relief that are dis-
cretionary: "[A]sylum, suspension of deportation, and adjustment of
status, but not withholding of deportation."'82
Additionally, the court found that the issues raised in Doherty's
claim for withholding necessitated an evidentiary hearing.18 A com-
plete factual record was necessary to determine whether Doherty would
be persecuted upon his return to Belfast, whether his acts were political
or nonpolitical, and whether he had persecuted others because of their
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1116.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. 485 U.S. 94 (1988).
182. Id. at 105 (emphasis added).
183. Doherty v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, INS, 908 F.2d 1108, 1117 (2d Cir. 1990).
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political opinions."" A hearing was necessary to develop such a record.
Therefore, the Attorney General abused his discretion by deciding Do-
herty's ultimate entitlement to relief without a developed record.1 85
The court next addressed Doherty's entitlement to a hearing on his
asylum claim, a "more difficult question" because asylum is a discre-
tionary remedy. 8" The court again cited the Supreme Court's holding
in Abudu, that the attorney general may "leap ahead" to determine
whether he would grant the alien asylum; thus, there is no entitlement
to a hearing if the attorney general decides that, even after a hearing,
he would not grant asylum to the applicant.18 However, the court also
felt the attorney general's discretion had limits. A reviewing court
could find abuse of discretion if the attorney general: (1) acted arbi-
trarily; (2) departed from established policies; (3) discriminated invidi-
ously against a particular group; or (4) gave effect to considerations
that Congress could not have intended to make relevant. 88 The court
found that, in this case, Thornburgh had abused his discretion by bas-
ing his decision on other than "legitimate concerns of asylum."'' 89
The Second Circuit found Congress intended to insulate the asy-
lum process from political influences. 9 Furthermore, under the United
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the
United States is a party, a person's status as a refugee is determined
without regard to political considerations or the politics of the country
from which the refugee had fled.' 9 ' Prior to 1980, the attorney general
had limitless discretion in granting asylum to refugees. Amid concern
that the Attorney General was making asylum determinations in viola-
tion of the Protocol by considering political exigencies, Congress re-
vised asylum procedures in the Refugee Act of 1980.119 By linking eli-
gibility for asylum to the politically neutral definition of "refugee" in
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 105 (1988)).
188. Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d at 1117-18.
189. Id. at 1118, 1121.
190. Id. at 1118; see also Political Legitimacy, supra note 74, at 458 ("The Refu-
gee Act of 1980 was explicitly designed to remove ideological bias from our immigra-
tion law.").
191. Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d at 1118. The Protocol incorporates the 1951 Con-
vention Relating to the Status of Refugees. See supra note 7. Article 1 of the Conven-
tion defines "refugee" as one who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality , membership of a particular social group or politi-
cal opinion, is outside the country of his nationality." Protocol, supra note 7, art. 1.
192. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.
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the Protocol, the Act limited the attorney general's discretion by insti-
tuting a procedure for adjudicating asylum claims devoid of ideological,
geographical, and political considerations.19
The Second Circuit found that in the decade since the Refugee
Act took effect, denials of asylum have been for legitimate humanita-
rian reasons rather than to preserve the United States' political rela-
tionship with the persecuting state." Attorney General Thornburgh,
however, based his decision "in large part on the types of geopolitical
concerns that Congress intended to eliminate from asylum cases. As
such, the Second Circuit found Attorney General Thornburgh abused
his discretion by denying Doherty's motion to reopen his deportation
proceedings.
E. The Supreme Court Reverses the Second Circuit
The Supreme Court announced its decision in INS v. Doherty on
January 15, 1992. In a 5 to 3 decision,1 96 the Court found that Attor-
ney General Thornburgh did not abuse his discretion in denying Do-
herty's motion to reopen.' 97
1. The Majority and Plurality Opinions
Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion. The
opinion consisted of four parts, only the first of which commanded a
five-vote majority.'9 8 Part I, in which Justices White, Blackmun,
O'Connor, and Kennedy joined, concluded that the Attorney General's
discretion to deny motions to reopen was broad. First, the Court noted
that the authority to reopen deportation proceedings was not created by
statute, but rather "derive[d] solely from regulations promulgated by
the Attorney General." '199 The regulation at issue provided that
"[m]otions to reopen ... shall not be granted unless it appears to the
Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not avail-
able and could not have been discovered or presented at the former
193. Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d at 1119.
194. Two types of cases have regularly been denied: (1) cases in which applicants
have abused the asylum process by fraudulently circumventing the overseas admissions
process; and (2) cases in which the refugee has found safe haven in a third country. Id.
at 1120-21.
195. Id. at 1121.
196. Justice Thomas did not hear the case.
197. INS v. Doherty, 60 U.S.L.W. 4085, 4086 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1992).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 4088.
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hearing ... 20 From that regulation, the Court determined that it
was within the broad discretion of the Attorney General to reopen de-
portation proceedings. 0 1
The Court then discussed the nature of the motion to reopen, com-
paring it to the petition for rehearing or motion for new trial based on
new evidence, describing both such motions as "disfavored" for the
same reasons.202 The Court recited Abudu as holding there were "at
least" three grounds upon which the BIA might deny a motion to reo-
pen: failure to establish a prima facie case for relief, failure to intro-
duce new, material evidence, and a determination by the attorney gen-
eral that the applicant was ineligible for the discretionary relief
sought.208 The Court further held that abuse of discretion was the
proper standard of review for denial of motions to reopen regardless of
whether the alien was seeking asylum or withholding of deportation.2 04
Thus, the Court tautologically concluded that, "[T]he proper applica-
tion of these principles leads inexorably to the conclusion that the At-
torney General did not abuse his discretion in denying reopening
. ,2o and thereby authorized the attorney general to deny motions
to reopen with unfettered discretion.
Justices White, Blackmun, and O'Connor joined Chief Justice
Rehnquist in Part II of his opinion. The plurality in Part II addressed
the Attorney General's findings that neither Attorney General Meese's
redesignation of Doherty's country of deportation nor the change in
Anglo-Irish extradition law constituted new facts such as to justify re-
opening because each event had been foreseeable at the time of Do-
herty's first hearing. Recall that the court of appeals had determined
that Attorney General Thornburgh's requirement that the new evi-
dence had been unforeseen at the time of the original proceeding, was
contrary to law. 206 The Chief Justice found justification for the Attor-
ney General's foreseeability requirement in 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1987), the
200. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1987).
201. INS v. Doherty, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4088.
202. Id. The "reasons" the Court alluded to came from Abudu, which listed one
such reason on the pages cited by the Court in Doherty: "There is a strong public
interest in bringing litigation to a close as promptly as is consistent with the interest in
giving the adversaries a fair opportunity to develop and present their respective cases."
INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 107-08 (1988).
203. INS v. Doherty, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4088.
204. Id. (quoting Abudu, 485 U.S. at 99 n.3).
205. Id.
206. Doherty v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, INS, 908 F.2d 1108, 1115-16 (2d Cir.
1990).
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regulation authorizing the Attorney General to reopen proceedings.
20 7
Thus, Part II of the opinion upheld the Attorney General's decision,
holding that his refusal to reopen a case because material evidence was
foreseeable was not an abuse of discretion.
Part III of the Chief Justice's opinion garnered the support only of
Justice Kennedy. Part III concentrated on the Attorney General's ar-
gument that, by withdrawing his application for asylum and withhold-
ing at his first deportation hearing, Doherty had waived his claim to
that relief.208 The Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy felt that what
Attorney General Thornburgh meant to say was that withdrawing one's
claim to gain a tactical advantage was not a reasonable explanation for
failing to pursue the claim at an earlier hearing, as required by 8
C.F.R. § 208.11 (1987).209 As such, the Attorney General did not
abuse his discretion in holding that Doherty had waived his right to
reopen. 210 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the alien who wishes
to gain a tactical advantage by withdrawing his application for with-
holding of deportation should plead in the alternative rather than with-
draw his claim.211 "There was nothing which prevented [Doherty] from
bringing evidence in support of his asylum and withholding of deporta-
tion claims at his first deportation proceeding, in case the Attorney
General did contest his designation of Ireland as the country to which
he be deported. 2 12
2. The Dissent
Justice Scalia wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Stevens and
Souter.213 Justice Scalia agreed that denying Doherty's motion to reo-
207. INS v. Doherty, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4089. "[Mlotions to reopen ... shall not be
granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material
and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former
hearing." 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1987).
208. Id.
209. Id. 8 C.F.R. § 208.11 provides that "[A motion to reopen to request asylum]
must reasonably explain the failure to request asylum prior to the completion of the
exclusion or deportation proceeding." (quoted in Abudu, 485 U.S. at 98 n.2). The
Court acknowledged that § 208.11 applied to asylum claims, not claims for withholding
of deportation, but repeated Abudu's holding that the requirements of § 208.11 regard-
ing asylum and § 3.2 regarding withholding of deportation are often duplicative. INS
v. Doherty, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4089 n.10.
210. INS v. Doherty, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4089.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 4090 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
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pen his proceedings so that he might apply for asylum was justified by
the attorney general's broad discretion to deny the ultimate grant of
asylum. 2 4 However, because the attorney general has no discretion to
deny withholding once a deportee has established statutory eligibility,
the same reasoning did not apply to the withholding of deportation. 21
In addition, the dissenting justices felt that Doherty had not waived his
right to reopen his proceedings to adjudicate his withholding claim;
thus, Attorney General Thornburgh had abused his discretion in deny-
ing Doherty's motion to reopen to apply for withholding.216
First, the dissent agreed with the court of appeals that, while the
decision to reopen is discretionary, "[elven discretion . . . has its legal
limits.12 17 The standard for reviewing the Attorney General's exercise
of discretion in this case, according to the dissent, are "those standards
of federal administration embodied in what we have described as 'the
'common law' of judicial review of agency action.' ",218 If the Attorney
General did so abuse his discretion, the judicial review provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act21 9 require courts to set aside the Attor-
ney General's decision.22
The dissent then examined the scope of the attorney general's dis-
cretion to deny reopening. Justice Scalia contradicted the majority's
view that the attorney general's discretion to deny reopening was ex-
tremely broad and argued instead that the motion to reopen is more
analogous to a remand to further proceedings than a reopening of a
court's final judgment. 21 The majority, according to Justice Scalia, er-
roneously viewed the motion to reopen deportation proceedings in the
-same light as would a court asked to reopen a final judgment - as "a
rarely accorded matter of grace. 222 What is nominally a "reopening"
is in fact a "remand" in immigration proceedings because reopening is
the only way a deportee may raise issues that become relevant only
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. See also Doherty v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, INS, 908 F.2d 1108, 1117 (2d
Cir. 1990) ("[I]t is a fundamental principle of our immigration law that the attorney
general must base his discretionary decisions only on the 'legitimate concerns' of the
relevant statutory provision.").
218. INS v. Doherty, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4090 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985)).
219. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
220. INS v. Doherty, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4090 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
221. Id.
222. Id.
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after an appellate decision.2 23 Reopening to argue newly-relevant issues
cannot be denied, according to Justice Scalia, "with the breadth of dis-
cretion that the Court today suggests.
224
The second justification offered by the dissent against the major-
ity's grant of unlimited discretion to the attorney general was that the
majority misread previous cases. 2 For example, the majority relied
upon the statement in INS v. Rios-Pineda226 that the attorney general
had broad discretion to deny reopening. The dissent attacked the ma-
jority's reliance on Rios-Pineda because that case involved a petition to
reopen so that the deportee could apply for relief that was itself subject
to the attorney general's discretion. 2 7 In contrast, Doherty had peti-
tioned to reopen to apply for withholding of deportation, which the at-
torney general may not deny once the deportee establishes statutory
eligibility.
The dissent then discussed the reasons why Congress denied the
attorney general discretion with respect to withholding of deportation.
The attorney general's nondiscretionary duty to withhold deportation of
an alien to a country where he or she faces persecution comports with
the United States' obligations under the United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees.2 28 Article 33.1 of the Convention
imposes an obligation of nonrefoulement, or refusal to return aliens to
a country where they will be persecuted. After the United States signed
the Protocol in 1968, and thereby bound itself by the nonrefoulement
provisions of the Convention, the attorney general was presumed to
honor the dictates of Article 33.1 in administering the law authorizing
withholding of deportation. 22 9 The presumption was replaced by posi-
tive law when Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980, making with-
holding mandatory upon a showing of statutory eligibility and thus con-
forming American law to Article 33 of the Convention.230
Given this history of the withholding provision, the dissent found
that the attorney general's discretion to deny withholding claims differs
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. 471 U.S. 444, 449 (1985).
227. INS v. Doherty, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4090 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
228. Id. See also Convention, supra note 7.
229. INS v. Doherty, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4090 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part) (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 429
(1987)).
230. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part in the judgment and dissenting in part)
(quoting INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 421 (1984)).
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substantially from his discretion to deny non-mandatory relief such as
asylum.231 In denying a petition to reopen proceedings for nonmanda-
tory relief, the Attorney General was within his discretion in deciding
that "Doherty [was] a sufficiently unsavory character not to be granted
asylum in this country. 21 32 However, such a determination is inappro-
priate in the context of mandatory relief. "The Attorney General could
not deny reopening here ... simply because he did not wish to provide
Doherty the relief of withholding. "233
The dissent next rejected the INS's three procedural bases for de-
nying Doherty's motion to reopen: (1) that Doherty had waived his
claim by withdrawing it at his first deportation proceeding, (2) that
Doherty failed to present new, material evidence, and (3) that Doherty
waived his right to object to the redesignation of the country to which
he would be deported by not raising his objection at his first deporta-
tion proceeding. 234 As for the argument that withdrawal equalled
waiver, Justice Scalia found no statutory or regulatory justification for
the INS's reasoning.235 Justice Scalia also attacked the Part III plural-
ity opinion regarding waiver, in which the Chief Justice and Justice
Kennedy suggested Doherty waived his right to withholding because he
failed to assert it as soon as possible.2 36 According to Justice Scalia:
"To state this argument is to expose its frailty; it simply does not fol-
low. Unless there is some rule that says you must object to a country
named in any capacity as soon as the opportunity presents itself, there
is no apparent reason why the failure to do so should cause the loss of a
legal right."' 3 The dissent discounted the Chief Justice's explanation
that such a rule exists - 8 C.F.R. § 208.11 - because that regulation
applies only to asylum, not withholding." 8 As a final rejection of the
waiver argument, the dissent contradicted the majority's reasoning that
Doherty waived his right to reopen by not providing a reasonable expla-
nation for his failure to argue against the designation of the United
Kingdom as the alternate country in his first deportation proceeding:
[I]t was surely arbitrary and therefore unlawful for the Attor-
ney General to say that the following did not qualify: "I did not
231. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
232. Id. at 4091.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 4091-92.
235. Id. at 4091.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 4091-92.
238. ld. at 4092.
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raise it earlier because I agreed I would abstain from doing so
in exchange for acceptance of my concession of deportability
and designation of Ireland; only when that acceptance was
withdrawn did I withdraw my abstention; and until then the
claim had absolutely no practical importance." If that is not
well within the term "reasonably explain," the words of the reg-
ulation are a sham and a snare.239
According to the dissent, exercising such a tactical choice did not oper-
ate as a waiver.
Next, the dissent addressed the plurality's assertion that the Attor-
ney General properly denied Doherty's motion to reopen because he
failed to present new, material evidence. Justice Scalia agreed that the
change in Irish extradition law was irrelevant, but disagreed as to the
materiality of Attorney General Meese's redesignation of the United
Kingdom as the country to which Doherty would be deported.24 Con-
ceding that such a redesignation was not what is typically considered to
be a "new fact," the dissent nonetheless argued that the regulations
made sense only if such administrative action did constitute a new fact.
Otherwise, the regulations would prohibit obviously necessary
remands. 241
To conclude his derogation of the INS's justifications for denying
Doherty's motion to reopen, Justice Scalia discussed an argument
raised by INS for the first time in oral argument: that under INS pro-
cedures Doherty was required to raise or waive his claim for withhold-
ing during his deportation hearing. 2 Aside from the observation that
"[tihe belated discovery of this point renders it somewhat suspect," the
dissent noted that counsel for INS had not even cited regulatory au-
thority for this proposition.24 3 Justice Scalia rejected INS's argument,
and determined that denial of a motion to reopen based on the INS's
automatic waiver argument would certainly be an abuse of
discretion.24
The dissent acknowledged the significance of the unusual facts and
procedural activity in the case:
It is also, in my view, an "abuse of discretion," if not indeed
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 4093.
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positively contrary to law, to deny "reopening" when the Attor-
ney General's decision substitutes a country that was an alter-
nate, at least where, as here, (1) the alien had assurance that
the country of primary destination would accept him, and (2)
there was no clear indication in the INS's rules or practice that
a country not objected to as an alternate could not later be ob-
jected to as the primary designation. . . . The term "arbitrary"
does not have a very precise content, but it is precise enough to
cover this." 5
Finally, the dissent discussed the argument that the attorney gen-
eral may "leap ahead" and decide the ultimate issue of entitlement to
the relief requested. 46 While Justice Scalia disagreed with the court of
appeals' holding that the attorney general may never decide whether
the alien is statutorily eligible for withholding without first holding a
hearing, the dissent specified that such a determination must be made
on the basis of a sufficiently developed record. If the Attorney General
had had before him a well-developed record from Doherty's first BIA
hearing, he properly could have decided whether Doherty was statuto-
rily eligible for withholding.4 7 Thus, according to the dissenters, the
Attorney General could not deny a deportee's motion to reopen pro-
ceedings in order to establish the factual basis for statutory eligibility if
the record was not sufficiently developed to make that determination., 8
Justice Scalia concluded that, as for Doherty's petition for with-
holding of deportation, Attorney General Thornburgh had abused his
discretion in denying Doherty's motion to reopen. Justice Scalia's rea-
soning notwithstanding, the Court held that Attorney General Thorn-
burgh had not abused his discretion regarding both the asylum and
withholding of deportation claims, thereby tacitly endorsing the attor-
ney general's discretion to consider United States foreign policy con-
cerns in refugee determinations.
V. FOREIGN POLICY IN ASYLUM DECISIONS
While the Supreme Court decided Doherty on narrow procedural
grounds, the case raises important questions regarding United States
245. Id. (emphasis in original).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 4094.
248. Id. The dissent did not decide whether the record before the Attorney Gen-
eral was sufficient to permit him to make such a determination as to Doherty's statu-
tory eligibility; rather, the dissent would have remanded to the Second Circuit for that
determination.
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immigration law. Justice Scalia's dissent touched on the issue of what
is required of United States immigration law under the Convention and
the Protocol, but the majority opinion did not mention either agree-
ment. Because these conventions are the law of the land,24 9 it bears
discussion of what is required under the Protocol, whether existing
United States statutes and regulations comply, and whether their im-
plementation by the executive branch, as exemplified by the Attorney
Generals' conduct in Doherty, is consistent with our obligations under
international law.
A. Requirements of the Protocol
The Protocol and the Convention "represent the international com-
munity's legal, social and humanitarian response to the plight of refu-
gees. '"250 The principal element of both agreements is the definition of
"refugee," a determination based on humanitarian rather than political
or geopolitical considerations. 251 Another central tenet of the Conven-
tion and Protocol is the principle of nonrefoulement: that contracting
states may not, in accordance with the Convention, return an alien to a
country where he or she would face persecution.2 52
The first step in any proceeding under the Convention is to deter-
mine whether the alien is a refugee; the second step is to apply the
Convention and the Protocol to the facts of the case.25 The first step
requires fact-finding "adequate to protect this fundamental right. 254
Adequate fact-finding is also required to determine whether the refugee
would be persecuted if returned to a particular country, the circum-
stance that triggers a contracting state's duty of nonrefoulement.2 55
249. U.S. Const. art. VI § 2.
250. Brief of Amicus Curiae Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees at 8, INS v. Doherty, 60 U.S.L.W. 4085 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1992) (No. 90-925)
[hereinafter UNHCR].
251. Id. at 20 ("It is clear that foreign policy considerations are not a factor in
the application of the humanitarian definition of refugee.").
252. Convention, supra note 7, art. 33.1.
253. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), HAND-
BOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 1 29 (1979)
[hereinafter HANDBOOK]. The HANDBOOK was prepared by the office of the UNHCR,
which is responsible for overseeing international protection of refugees. Specifically,
UNHCR promotes ratification of the Convention and Protocol and supervises their ap-
plication by contracting states. UNHCR, supra note 250, at 2.
254. Brief for Amici Curiae Amnesty International and Amnesty International -
USA at 24, INS v. Doherty, 60 U.S.L.W. 4085 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1992) (No. 90-925)
[hereinafter Amnesty International].
255. Id. at 27.
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However, neither the Convention nor the Protocol define specific proce-
dures necessary to ensure adequate fact-finding for these purposes.2 56
The Handbook does set forth certain minimum procedural require-
ments, including the requirement that aliens have access to the neces-
sary facilities to present their claims. 51 Another minimum requirement
is a complete personal interview with the applicant.2 58 Generally, how-
ever, the rule is that refugee and asylum status cannot be decided with-
out an opportunity for the alien to present his or her claim to the ap-
propriate authorities.259
B. Statutory Compliance with the Protocol
The Supreme Court has held that Congress, in enacting the Refu-
gee Act of 1980, intended to bring United States law into compliance
with the Protocol and the Convention.26 Further, Congress intended
the nonrefoulement (withholding of deportation) provisions of the law
to be construed in accordance with the Protocol.2 6 1 Thus, in accordance
with the Protocol as interpreted by the UNHCR, § 208(a) of the Refu-
gee Act provides for individualized decisionmaking.2 62 Eligibility for
asylum is decided on an "ideologically neutral and apolitical stan-
dard. ' ' 263 The law as written, therefore, complies with the United
States' obligations under the Convention and the Protocol.264
256. Id. at 27-28.
257. HANDBOOK, supra note 253, 192.
258. UNHCR, supra note 250, at 12 (quoting Executive Committee Conclusions
No. 30 (XXXIV), Report of the 34th Session of the High Commissioner's Programme,
UN Doc. A/AC 96/631 (1983)).
259. Id. at 13. See also Amnesty International, supra note 254, at 34
("[I]nternational law implicitly requires that asylum and deportation determinations be
made by means of a hearing on the merits.").
260. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987). See also H.R. Rep.
No. 96-608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) at 9 (Adoption of the Convention's definition
of "refugee" intended to bring United States law into conformity with the Convention).
261. S. Rep. No. 96-590, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1980) at 19.
262. Members of Congress, supra note 118, at 7.
263. Id. at 8. Prior to 1980, the refugee laws of the United States were politically-
driven, limiting eligibility for asylum to refugees from communist or Middle Eastern
countries. Id.
264. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (Supp. 1991), allowing the Attorney General to redesig-
nate the country to which an alien will be deported if deporting the alien to his or her
designated country would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States, does not
on its face violate the prohibition against consideration of foreign policy concerns in
asylum decisions so long as the principle of nonrefoulement is respected. Attorney Gen-
eral Meese, however, ordered Doherty deported to a country where, arguably, he faced
persecution. Such an exercise of discretion violated the United States' obligations under
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C. Administrative Compliance with the Protocol
1. Individualized Factfinding
Having determined that United States law regarding asylum and
deportation comports with the obligations imposed by the Convention
and the Protocol, the next inquiry is whether the regulations promul-
gated by the attorney general to implement those laws, and the actual
administrative decisions of the BIA and the attorney general, are like-
wise consistent.2 65 Returning to the facts of Doherty, recall that Attor-
ney General Thornburgh determined that Doherty would be ineligible
for the ultimate relief of withholding of deportation because he had
committed serious nonpolitical crimes outside the United States and
because he had persecuted others for their political beliefs. Recall also
that the Attorney General made this decision based largely on the rec-
ord of PIRA activities developed in the McMullen case.216 Basing the
decision as to Doherty's ultimate entitlement to relief on facts devel-
oped in the case of a different alien flatly contradicted the requirements
of the Convention. 6 7
2. Balancing of Inclusion and Exclusion Clauses
The Attorney General also failed to follow the prescribed proce-
dure for balancing inclusion and exclusion clauses.26 8 Article 1F(b) of
the Convention permits a contracting state to exclude from refugee sta-
tus any alien for whom there are serious reasons for considering that
the alien committed a serious non-political crime. This provision is du-
plicated in United States law by 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(C). The Attor-
ney General found that Doherty was excluded by § 1253(h)(2)(A) &
the Convention and the Protocol.
265. See IHRLG, supra note 117, at 13 ("As an executive official, the Attorney
General must conform his actions to the laws and treaties of the United States. Any
discretion granted him by Congress with respect to asylum must therefore be exercised
in accordance with the Protocol.").
266. See Appendix, supra note 46, at 84a-90a.
267. UNHCR, supra note 250, at 13. See also ACLU, supra note 144, at 24 ("It
borders on the Orwellian for the Attorney General to contend that he can deny Do-
herty's right to a hearing on the basis of a conclusion that can be reached only after a
hearing has been conducted.").
268. The inclusion clauses are the definition of refugee and nonrefoulement.
Aliens meeting these definitions are thereby "included" within the protection of the
Convention and the Protocol. The exclusion clauses outline situations in which a bona
fide refugee may nonetheless be excluded from protection because of his or her past
actions.
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(C) and ended the inquiry. However, the Handbook requires a weigh-
ing of the inclusion clauses. The contracting party must weigh the na-
ture of the offense thought to have been committed by the alien against
the degree of persecution the alien fears.2 69 Thus, even though an appli-
cant falls within the exclusion clause of Article 1F(b) of the Conven-
tion and 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2), if the fear of persecution is great, the
Convention requires nonrefoulement. In addition to foregoing individu-
alized factfinding, the Attorney General failed to balance properly the
inclusion clauses against the exclusion clauses.270 While the regulations
as written comport with the United States' obligations under the Con-
vention and Protocol,2 71 as applied by the Attorneys General and as
sanctioned by the Supreme Court, they fall short.
3. Foreign Policy Considerations
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the Doherty case is the con-
sideration by Attorneys General Meese and Thornburgh of foreign pol-
icy concerns, and the failure of the Supreme Court to put an end to
such consideration. Attorney General Meese considered foreign policy
when he redesignated the country to which Doherty would be deported
from Ireland to the United Kingdom, finding that deporting Doherty to
Ireland "would be injurious to our relations with the United King-
dom. ' '2 72  The Second Circuit upheld the Attorney General's
redesignation.2 73
Foreign policy considerations next appeared in Attorney General
Thornburgh's denial of Doherty's motion to reopen; Thornburgh cited
as one the reasons for his decision that Doherty would not ultimately
269. HANDBOOK, supra note 253, 1 156.
270. See Amnesty International, supra note 254, at 47-48.
271. See INS v. Doherty, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4090-94 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
272. Appendix, supra note 46, at 126a-27a. Meese based his decision on the
strength of a recommendation by the State Department suggesting that Doherty should
be returned to the United Kingdom because: (1) "The government and the people of
the United Kingdom would not welcome a decision by the Attorney General to deport
Doherty elsewhere;" (2) failure to do so would erode confidence in the willingness of
the United States to fight terrorism; and (3) the United Kingdom felt so strongly about
the case that failure to return Doherty would damage the relationship between the two
nations. Id. For a discussion of the role of State Department advisory opinions in asy-
lum adjudications, see Richard K. Preston, Asylum Adjudications: Do State Depart-
ment Advisory Opinions Violate Refugees' Rights and U.S. International Obligations?,
45 MD. L. REV. 91 (1986).
273. Doherty v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, INS, 908 F.2d 1108, 1113-14 (2d Cir.
1990).
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be entitled to asylum because it would further United States policy
against ter orism to deport Doherty to the United Kingdom, and be-
cause it would damage United States-United Kingdom relations not
to.274 The Second Circuit found this consideration to be an abuse of
discretion. 75 Before the Supreme Court, the INS argued that, because
the Convention and the Protocol require only nonrefoulement, not a
grant of asylum, a contracting state properly may consider foreign pol-
icy objectives in the asylum decision.276 The Supreme Court did not
consider the question.277 While such restraint may have been justified
because the Court decided the issue on procedural grounds, the ques-
tion of whether the attorney general may consider foreign policy con-
siderations in asylum decisions remains open and eventually must be
resolved.
The amici were unanimous in arguing that the Convention and
Protocol prohibit consideration of foreign policy in asylum adjudica-
tions.2 7 To allow such consideration would "render virtually meaning-
less the politically neutral international definition of 'refugee.' "279
First, the Convention and Protocol list criteria that states should con-
sider in granting refugee status; foreign policy grounds are not in-
cluded.28 ° In fact, the drafters of the Convention and Protocol recog-
nized that refugee situations could create foreign policy concerns.2 81
Rather than allowing such concerns to influence asylum decisions, the
Convention requires contracting states to "do everything within their
power to prevent this problem from becoming a cause of tension be-
tween States. ' 28 2 In so doing, the Convention reaffirms the humanita-
rian nature of the refugee criteria by regarding the grant of refugee
status as a non-political act with no foreign policy consequences. 28 3
274. Id. at 1121.
275. Id. The distinction between the Meese order considering foreign policy in
redesignating the United Kingdom and the Thornburgh order considering foreign pol-
icy in determining that Doherty would not ultimately be entitled to asylum was that
the Meese order was expressly authorized by statute, while the Thornburgh order con-
travened the non-political nature of the Refugee Act. Id.
276. Brief of Petitioner at 24-25, INS v. Doherty, 60 U.S.L.W. 4085 (U.S. Jan.
14, 1992) (No. 90-925).
277. INS v. Doherty, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4087-88.
278. ACLU, supra note 144, at 25-28; Amnesty International, supra note 254, at
50-62; IHRLG, supra note 117, at 9-48; Members of Congress, supra note 118, at 7-
26; UNHCR, supra note 250, at 19-24.
279. UNHCR, supra note 250, at 20.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 21-22.
282. Id. at 22 (quoting the Preanible to the Convention).
283. Id. at 22. IHRLG posed the following hypothetical that illustrates how dan-
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Another basis for considering that the Convention and Protocol do
not allow states to raise foreign policy concerns in asylum decisions is
that Article 3 of the Convention prohibits discrimination against refu-
gees on the basis of country of origin; denial of asylum claims for for-
eign policy reasons implicates Article 3.284 Thus, the weight of author-
ity precludes foreign policy considerations from entering into asylum
adjudications. While United States statutory law conforms to the dic-
tates of the Protocol and the Convention, executive administration and
Supreme Court interpretation of the law impermissibly allows foreign
policy considerations in asylum adjudications.
VI. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court decision reversing the Second Circuit and up-
holding Attorney General Thornburgh's exercise of discretion contra-
venes international law. Also, the failure of the Supreme Court to rein
in the Attorney General's unfettered discretion to consider foreign pol-
icy in asylum adjudications virtually guarantees that the Court will be
forced to revisit the subject.
By ignoring Congress' expressly stated purpose in enacting the
Refugee Act of 1980 - to bring the United States into compliance
with the Convention and the Protocol - the Court sanctioned the
United States' continued violation of its international obligations. The
Court let stand INS procedures that short-circuit due process by erect-
ing "raise it or waive it" hurdles where they do not exist statutorily and
that resurrect the politically-motivated asylum laws of the past.
Worse yet, there is still no bar to the INS or the Attorney General
making asylum decisions based on foreign policy concerns. Rather than
gerous it would be to allow foreign policy considerations to influence asylum
adjudications:
The United Kingdom may consider Mr. Doherty's presence in the United
States to be a nuisance, and that may cause some tension with an old ally.
But under international law, the British (like the Chinese) have no right to
take umbrage at a grant of asylum made on purely humanitarian grounds. If,
however, the Attorney General can deny asylum to an allegedly British citi-
zen because we have good relations with the United Kingdom, but grant it to
a Chinese citizen because we disapprove of that government's actions, then
the offended government would be absolutely correct in claiming that the
grant of asylum is an unfriendly act.
IHRLG, supra note 117, at 32-33.
284. Amnesty International, supra note 254, at 51. In granting Doherty's motion
to reopen, one member of the BIA suggested that the Attorney General's decision to
deny reopening was based on Doherty's national origin. Appendix, supra note 46, at
114a-15a. See also IHRLG, supra note 117, at 20-21.
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being an interesting pedagogical exercise to determine the role of for-
eign policy in refugee law, the question is of critical and timely impor-
tance. It is apparent from the case law that courts and administrative
boards have excluded certain claimants on the basis of political ideol-
ogy rather than the statutory standard of well-founded fear," 5 and
some argue that such invalid considerations continue to be weighed to
this day."8 Thus, while Doherty may not have been the appropriate
vehicle for the Court to address foreign policy-driven asylum decisions,
the pressure is mounting to bring United States asylum procedures into
compliance with international law." 7 If Congress fails to fix the prob-
lem by explicitly limiting the attorney general's discretion to deny with-
holding and reopening, the Court will have to do so eventually.
Perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of the Doherty case is that it
did not have to drag on for nine years. Concededly, the United States
government has a right to refuse to provide a safe haven to terrorists
who exploit the political offense exception to extradition. Unfortu-
nately, in its zeal to please the United Kingdom, the United States by-
passed the simplest way to ensure Doherty's return to Britain - filing
the extradition request with another judge. Recall that such a strategy
worked in Ahmad.288
Assuming that the United States again lost its bid to extradite Do-
285. See Political Legitimacy, supra note 74, at 450-51.
286. For example, human rights groups have protested the United States' policy
of returning Haitian "boat people" who have escaped to the United States since the
overthrow of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The United States asserts these people
are economic, rather than political, refugees. On the other hand, Cuban refugees are
still routinely granted political asylum without having to prove individualized fear of
persecution. "U.S. officials - at the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the State
Department, and Congress - privately admit that the preferential treatment of
Cubans over all other nationalities, not just Haitians, is a remnant of the cold war as
well as the spoil of the powerful Cuban-American lobby based in southern Florida."
Clara Germani, U.S. in Quandary Over Treatment of Boat People, CHRISTIAN SCI-
ENCE MONITOR, Feb. 5, 1992, at 1.
287. The Justice Department recently settled a case brought by Salvadoran and
Guatamalan refugees who claimed that the INS had treated aliens who came from
countries with whom the United States had friendly relations less favorably than aliens
who came from countries toward whom the United States was openly hostile, such as
Nicaragua. In the settlement agreement, the INS stipulated that, "foreign policy and
border enforcement considerations are not relevant to the determination of whether an
applicant for asylum has a well-founded fear of persecution;" and "the fact that an
individual is from a country whose government the United States supports or with
which it has favorable relations is not relevant to the determination of whether an
applicant for asylum has a well-founded fear of persecution." American Baptist
Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
288. Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1065 (2d Cir. 1990).
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herty, it had other options. Because it is illegitimate for the United
States to accomplish through deportation what it could not through ex-
tradition, the United States would have to abandon its hope of re-
turning Doherty to the United Kingdom. However, under the Conven-
tion and the Protocol, such foreign policy considerations have no place
in refugee law - the United Kingdom may not regard the grant of
asylum as a hostile act with political consequences. While concededly
this is a legal fiction bearing little resemblance to geopolitical reality, it
is nonetheless the law that binds the United States.
As for expelling this "terrorist" from its shores failing extradition,
the United States should have proceeded with deportation proceedings
in accordance with the Convention. The Convention provides for, and
United States law embodies, legitimate reasons to exclude refugees.
Assuming Doherty had a hearing with the full panoply of procedural
rights required by the Convention, he would still have had to establish
statutory eligibility for withholding. To do so, he first would have had
to prove himself to be a refugee: that he had a well-founded fear of
persecution if returned to Northern Ireland. Assuming he made out a
prima facie case of refugee status, the INS could then have introduced
evidence that Doherty should be excluded because: (1) there were seri-
ous reasons for believing Doherty committed serious nonpolitical crimes
in Northern Ireland, and/or (2) he persecuted others because of their
political beliefs. The second is easier to prove: Doherty confessed to the
murder and admitted his membership in a paramilitary organization
with a history of persecution of those with divergent views toward Brit-
ish rule of Northern Ireland.2 89
The Handbook provides guidance in deciding the first issue,
whether Doherty committed a serious nonpolitical crime in Northern
Ireland.2 09 This prong of the test is a much closer call than the persecu-
289. Matter of Doherty by Gov't of United Kingdom, 599 F. Supp. 270, 272-74
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). The United States has demonstrated that it is willing to go to great
lengths to provide evidence that Doherty persecuted others. In August, 1990, the
American Consul-General in Belfast asked author and journalist Martin Dillon to be a
prosecution witness against Doherty. After Dillon expressed reluctance, he was con-
tacted by the office of U.S. Attorney Otto Obermaier in New York. The U.S. Attorney
wanted Dillon as an expert witness to testify about the nature of IRA membership.
Dillon asked for the file on the case, and it was delivered to him in Belfast within
twenty-four hours. The U.S. Attorney then flew Dillon to New York at United States
expense to discuss the case. While Dillon never testified, the anecdote illustrates the
effort the Justice Department is able and willing to put forth to prove that Doherty is
ineligible for relief. McCrystal, supra note 10, at 23.
290. Issues to consider include: (1) the nature and purpose of the act committed
- for political motives or personal gain? (2) a close and direct causal link between the
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tion prong. Even assuming that the BIA would have found Doherty's
crimes to have been political, the BIA should then, in accordance with
the Convention, have weighed the reasons for exclusion against Do-
herty's fear of persecution. Even if the BIA were to have found Do-
herty statutorily eligible for withholding, the law allows, and the Con-
vention does not prohibit, the INS to certify that question to the
attorney general, who then would review the now completely developed
factual record. The attorney general is the ultimate arbiter of whether
an alien meets the statutory requirements for withholding. The Con-
vention does not forbid, and even Justice Scalia would not object to, the
attorney general overturning a decision of the BIA and finding Doherty
ineligible for withholding, so long as the attorney general considered
the fully and fairly developed factual record and did not consider such
illegitimate concerns as foreign policy.
However, the government still would have had an option if the At-
torney General could not, after reviewing the record, find that the BIA
erred in finding Doherty eligible for withholding. Such a finding would
have meant only that the United States could not deport Doherty to the
United Kingdom. Recall that the Convention requires only nonrefoule-
ment, not automatic grants of asylum for every refugee. Thus, the
United States could have deported Doherty to a third country where he
would not face persecution. Such a solution may not have satisfied the
administration's desire to placate the United Kingdom, but it could
have furthered United States policies of fighting terrorism by ensuring
that such actors do not find safe haven on our shores, and, more impor-
tantly, it would have conformed to our obligations under international
law.
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite the founding fathers' desire to protect those who advocate
political change in other nations, few would contend that protection
was designed to provide refuge to those who would bomb a civilian
crime committed and its political purpose, (3) the balance between the political ele-
ment and the common law character of the act, and (4) whether the acts, even if
politically motivated, were nonetheless atrocious. HANDBOOK, supra note 253, 152.
Recall that Judge Sprizzo based his decision that Doherty's crimes were political on
similar grounds. Matter of Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 275-76. However, Judge Sprizzo's
determination would not bind another immigration judge. McMullen v. INS, 788 F.2d
591, 597 (9th Cir. 1986) (extradition determinations have no res judicata effect in
subsequent judicial proceedings); see also Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1063 (2d
Cir. 1990).
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bus,2 91 send letter bombs to clergymen,292 detonate a bomb in a
crowded marketplace, 93 or hold an innocent family hostage in its home
in order to mount an ambush. 94
Joseph Doherty is a convicted murderer, despite the political moti-
vations of his act. While sending Doherty to a third country would not
have ensured his punishment, a declared policy goal of the United
States, it would have enabled the United States to respect the philoso-
phy behind the political offense exception and the humanitarian pur-
poses of refugee law while refusing to become a safe haven for
terrorists.
Attorney General William-Barr had an opportunity to correct the
errors of his predecessors by granting Doherty a hearing despite the
Court's ruling. Such an action by the Attorney General would have
preserved the United States' integrity in the community of nations and
reaffirmed our commitment to international law. Instead, Attorney
General Barr perpetuated the corruption of United States asylum laws
to accomplish a prohibited extradition in contravention of our interna-
tional obligations.
Even though Doherty is back in the United Kingdom, many ques-
tions raised by his case remain. Irish citizens from both sides of the
conflict continue to arrive in the United States, 95 and it is only a mat-
ter of time before another Joe Doherty appears before a United States
court. While the Supplementary Treaty of Extradition between the
United States and the United Kingdom has addressed the extradition
issue, the deportation and asylum questions raised in Doherty remain
viable. Furthermore, the recent situation involving Haitian refugees
demonstrates that foreign policy considerations are alive and well in
291. See Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990).
292. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882
(1986).
293. See Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894
(1981).
294. Matter of Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 272.
295. For example, in January, 1992, an immigration judge in New York granted
political asylum to Sean Mackin. Mackin, a Catholic, had left Belfast with his family
in 1984, fleeing threats from British security forces. Mackin had been arrested more
than 50 times in Belfast without ever having been convicted of a crime and had been
severely beaten by prison guards. As with Joe Doherty's case, the United Kingdom
pressured the United States to reject Mackin's asylum request. Mackin was the first
Irish immigrant ever granted political asylum. See Charles Bremner, Belfast Man
Wins Asylum in America, THE TIMES (London), Jan. 9, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, MAJPAP file; M. P. McQueen, Political Asylum for Irish Immigrant,
NEWSDAY, Jan. 8, 1992, at 7.
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United States asylum adjudications. Three attorneys general and the
Supreme Court passed on the opportunity to bring the United States
into compliance with international law in Doherty; the chance will
surely come again.
Jennifer M. Corey
